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Case Summaries

ERISA

[11/07] Marrs v. Motorola, Inc.
In an ERISA class action, plaintiff-appellant's motion for leave to correct his notice of appeal to clarify that he was appealing in both his individual and representative capacities is denied where, under Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), failure to indicate that a class representative is appealing in his representative capacity stripped the court of jurisdiction to hear the arguments of the class.

[10/30] Oliver v. Coca Cola Co.
In light of controlling precedent in White v. Coca-Cola Co., which found defendant's interpretation of the offset provision to be reasonable and entitled to deference, the issue of damages is remanded for recalculation. All other previous rulings in Oliver v. Coca-Cola Co., 506 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) are affirmed.

[10/23] Leister v. Dovetail, Inc.
In a suit by an employee under ERISA to recover 401(k) contributions that defendant-employer allegedly promised but failed to make, judgment and award of damages to plaintiff and denial of statutory penalties are affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) plaintiff was entitled to relief under both breach-of-fiduciary-duty and recovery-of-benefits-owed claims; 2) the relief under the benefits-recovery claim was to consist of both the unpaid contributions and a reasonable estimate of their growth had they been timely deposited in plaintiff's 401(k) plan, and remand was necessary to recalculate the benefits owed; 3) a supplemental claim regarding failure to pay sales commissions was not an ERISA claim, but must be considered on remand as a supplemental state-law claim; and 4) the failure to grant statutory penalties must be reconsidered on remand in light of defendants' willful conduct and ability to pay.

[10/22] Orth v. Wisconsin State Employees Union, Council 24
In a suit under ERISA and the Taft-Hartley Act alleging that defendants violated the provisions of an ERISA plain contained in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), summary judgment for plaintiffs is affirmed where: 1) the contract was clear on its face as to the percentage of plaintiff's health-insurance premiums the employer was to pay, and subsequent modifications to the CBA were not evidence of a latent ambiguity in the agreement; 2) the principle that contracts can be modified by the subsequent conduct of the parties is inapplicable to ERISA plans unless the conduct is proved by a writing; and 3) the award of attorneys' fees in an amount greater than the remedial award was proper.

[09/30] Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco
In a challenge to municipally mandated employer health care spending requirements, summary judgment for plaintiff is reversed and the case remanded with instruction to enter summary judgment for defendant where the spending requirements are not preempted by ERISA because: 1) the spending requirements do not create an ERISA "plan" as defined by 29 U.S.C. section 1002(1); and 2) the spending requirements do not have an impermissible connection with employers' ERISA plans, or make impermissible reference to such plans.

[09/30] Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc.
In an ERISA case alleging breach of fiduciary duty by a plan administrator, motion to dismiss is affirmed where even a plan's sole beneficiary cannot, on behalf of an ERISA plan, bring a pro se action for breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. section 1109(a).

[09/29] Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan
In an ERISA challenge to denial of benefits, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) issue preclusion does not apply in the ERISA context; 2) by notifying defendant of reasons why the claims administrator should reconsider the denial of claims, plaintiff invoked the plan's internal review procedures; and 3) by letting the initial determination stand, defendant made clear that internal review procedures were complete and thus plaintiff's administrative remedies were exhausted.

[09/22] Poore v. Simpson Paper Co.
In a dispute over retirement benefits, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where: 1) plaintiffs interests had not vested, and the court lacked ERISA jurisdiction, because the collective bargaining agreement in question reserved defendant's right to change the welfare benefits in question; and 2) plaintiffs' contractual claims did not trigger jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act because the rights in question were not vested.

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Government Benefits

[11/14] Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P'ship
In an action alleging that defendant-landlord unlawfully refused to accept Section 8 vouchers as payment for rent, summary judgment for tenants in part is affirmed, and for landlord in part is reversed, where: 1) federal housing law prevented landlord from unilaterally declaring that the units in question were no longer being offered for rental housing, but instead required that landlord meet the requirements of local law for making such a determination; and 2) the uncontested fact that landlord refused payment via voucher, while insisting it would accept cash, made out a facial violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act.

[11/12] US v. Kaufman
In a criminal matter involving defendants who had directed severely mentally ill residents of their treatment center to perform sexually explicit acts and farm labor in the nude, allegedly as psychotherapy, their convictions for forced labor and involuntary servitude are affirmed where: 1) even if the trial court plainly erred in ordering defendants to avoid eye contact with former residents who testified against them at trial, they failed to establish that the error affected their substantial rights; 2) there was no plain error in instructing the jury on the meaning of "labor" and "services" under statutes of conviction; and 3) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for involuntary servitude. However, on cross-appeal, defendant-wife's sentence is remanded for resentencing where it was procedurally unreasonable because: 1) the evidence supported applying certain enhancements, and the district court failed to make findings sufficient to justify its refusal to apply them; and 2) an obstruction of justice enhancement was supported by the record as well.

[11/12] James v. Richman
In a suit seeking Medicaid benefits, an injunction preventing defendant-Department of Public Welfare from denying benefits is affirmed where: 1) equitable relief was appropriate where plaintiff would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment from seeking monetary damages from the state; 2) plaintiff was not required to exhaust his state-level administrative remedies before seeking federal relief; and 3) a non-revocable, non-transferable annuity purchased by plaintiff's wife did not fit the statutory definition of an "available resource" for purposes of calculating Medicaid eligibility.

[11/06] Mouser v. Astrue
In a social security benefits case, an order denying remand and affirming a denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits is affirmed where: 1) there was no abuse of discretion in finding a lack of good cause to remand the case for consideration of new evidence pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g); 2) the ALJ's credibility assessment was proper; and 3) the record was lacking in evidence that would have put the ALJ on notice that claimant's mental capacity could be at issue, and the ALJ fully and fairly developed the record based on the evidence before him.

[11/05] Vasquez v. Astrue
A ruling upholding a denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits is vacated and remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for a hearing on the issue of whether claimant was entitled to benefits where: 1) the ALJ erred in discrediting claimant's symptom testimony, and applying the credit-as-true rule, on remand the ALJ is instructed to accept her symptom testimony as true in determining whether she is entitled to benefits; and 2) for purposes of a finding of mental impairment, the ALJ should have been afforded an opportunity to consider additional evidence generated between the ALJ's decision and an Appeals Council hearing.

[11/05] Bowie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
A decision upholding a denial of social security disability benefits where, on the particular facts of this case, it was procedurally acceptable for the ALJ not to address in his opinion that plaintiff was "borderline" between age groups under 20 C.F.R. section 404.1563(b). There is no per se procedural requirement in section 404.1563(b) to address age categorization explicitly in borderline situations, but a lack of an explanation for arriving at a particular age categorization may in some cases mean that an ALJ's ultimate decision is not supported by sufficient evidence.

[10/23] Miller v. Estate of Wladyslaw
In a suit by a hospital seeking to recover fees for emergency medical care rendered to the victim of a car accident, summary judgment for plaintiff-hospital is affirmed where a hospital that is required by law to provide emergency medical care to an uninsured patient, who later becomes eligible for Medicaid, may seek to collect payment for the patient's medical bills by enforcing a lien against a settlement the patient recovered from a third-party tortfeasor rather than billing Medicaid.

[10/09] Hogan v. Peake
Denial of a veteran's claim for service connection for generalized anxiety disorder is affirmed where the Veterans Court did not adopt a rule that a medical opinion lacks credibility if it does not state definitively or with "absolute medical certainty" when a particular disorder or condition began. (Corrected opinion)

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